Elections and Earthquakes
The first round of the Turkish presidential election on 14 May was a disappointment for almost everyone. There was no winner. The opposition was convinced that years of economic mismanagement, along with a devastating earthquake exacerbated by the notorious corruption of the Turkish construction industry, would drive Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from office. His supporters believed that the great man would crush his enemies once again. But as neither side secured more than 50% of the vote, a second ballot needed to be held. When it was, Erdoğan was clearly the winner.
In North America and most of Europe, the result has generally been described as unwelcome and perhaps even disastrous. But is it?
There is little doubt that Erdoğan’s success was due to policies that became ruthless and vindictive following protests against his plans to build a mosque at Istanbul’s Gezi Park in 2013 and a coup attempt against him in 2016. The only two politicians who might have led a credible challenge to his authority both faced criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The press and television stations had been placed in the hands of AKP and its supporters by an obliging judiciary and voices opposed to Erdoğan were rarely heard during the campaign. The result was an election that has been seen as “free but not fair”, although it was not really either. While some degree of irregularity appears undeniable – Turkish nationalist candidates received an astonishing number of votes in Kurdish areas of the country, for example – no one seems to doubt that Erdoğan really won the election. He is therefore in a stronger position than he was before. His reign and his policies will endure for another five years, at least if his health remains robust.
His undoubted appeal lies in an ability to display a patriarchal authority as well as an unwavering devotion to traditional values that half the country finds inspiring and reassuring. The other half, of course, disagrees. Nevertheless, after more than two decades of AKP government, Erdoğan continues to represent hope for the new middle classes in Turkey that a more affluent way of life will continue even though levels of personal debt have become almost insupportable. Whatever the risks, millions of Turks thought them less alarming than those posed by a rival candidate who had never held a position of greater responsibility than leader of the opposition and who never appeared to be tough enough for the job.
This may be worth remembering, especially in Europe. In the hope of winning the second ballot if he could attract support from the far right, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu promised to expel “more than 10 million” refugees from Turkish territory. Would he have made a serious attempt to do it? Who really knows, but the consequences would have been appalling. Even the risk that he might try would have been profoundly alarming in most of Europe, especially given a war in Ukraine and rising tension in the Balkans. European politicians have years of experience in negotiating with Erdoğan when refugees are used as political weapons, and a known quantity is undoubtedly preferable at a time of rising uncertainty.
Erdoğan also wants something. His position requires the appearance of power as well as the reality of it. Sophisticated American weaponry is fundamental to both, especially as Russian equipment has been seen to be no more effective in Ukraine than Russian tactics. Erdoğan has been allowed by Washington to purchase much of what he wants from the United States, but not yet everything that he wants, including the most advanced versions of the F16. At the same time, he has the ability to grant favors that are of great importance to American strategists, including an agreement that Sweden will have the unanimous support it needs to enter NATO just as Finland has done. There is clearly an opportunity for both sides in the conversation.
Erdoğan’s attitude to NATO is undoubtedly ambivalent. Although a man of considerable intelligence and a politician of extraordinary ability, he has little formal education and no real knowledge of English or other foreign languages. He is therefore suspicious of a world that he sees as alien, even if his attitude tends to be pragmatic and transactional. His ambitions also extend beyond Europe and into Africa and Asia.
While Turkey was certainly involved in the rivalries of the Cold War, it played little more than a supporting role. The alternative at the time, the Non-Aligned Movement or NAM, was in large part a reaction to the bellicosity of the Great Powers, but a new unwillingness to choose sides, often known as NAM 2.0, reflects growing unease or alarm at the implications of a globalized economy dominated by the United States and its rivalry with China and Russia. In countries such as India and Turkey, it is not surprising that a vision of a new international order has also been accompanied by enthusiastic or aggressive forms of ethnic and religious nationalism.
So what will Erdoğan choose? He would naturally prefer Turkish prominence within the enduring structures of earlier decades as well as a leading role in a new NAM 2.0. Can he have both? His country has extended its reach throughout the world by relying on the soft power of its media as well as the harder forms of power displayed in its successful aerial drones. Turkish military technology is highly attractive to foreign investors as well as foreign customers, and it is only one in a series of lucrative possibilities that include property development in Istanbul or along the Mediterranean coast and the growing markets offered by Turkish consumers. For the rest of the world, therefore, Turkey remains tantalizing. In that sense, Erdoğan’s victory has changed little. The claims that it represents a defeat for either American or European interests and that Kılıçdaroğlu would have been a more effective or at least a more amenable president seem excitable as well as condescending.