Modern interstate relations are generally thought to have begun with the 17th-century treaties of Prague and Westphalia, which sought to remove religion from among the causes of interstate conflict: cuius regio, eius religio (“whose land, his religion”) was the legal principle, associating state sovereignty with a single dominant faith, and putting an end, however imperfectly, to wars of religion. Modern international relations were built on this segregation of religion from the struggles of states with each other. The resurgence of religion since the demise of aggressive Communist atheism in the 1980s has often been seen as anti-modern, or as a revival of the pre-modern — certainly as far as international relations are concerned. However that may be, religion cannot be ignored by international investors. Shariah compliance and acceptance of Hindutva priorities are two examples. Less obvious is the type of strategic calculation that has led the unlikely figure of Vladimir Putin to embrace Islam as part of his geopolitical practice.
Putin has been viewed as having a significant connection to the Russian Orthodox church since at least 2000, just after he assumed power, when he referred to Orthodoxy as having “largely determined the character of Russian civilization.” He expected the traditional church to speed “the spiritual and moral rebirth of the Fatherland.” After more than two decades in power, Putin has continued to partner with Russian Orthodoxy in his attempts to solidify Russian cultural nationalism, not least in anti-LGBTQ laws (framed as part of Putin’s struggle with a spiritually degraded West) and in his justifications for the invasion of Ukraine, which has been strongly backed by the Orthodox church. Cuius regio, eius religio.
Yet at the same time Putin has sought to leverage the fact that Russia has the largest Muslim population of any European country, assuming Turkey is not seen as European. On the strength of that fact, Russia acquired observer status at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 2005 and is still the only major non-Muslim-majority country to do so. (India was invited but declined.) As a petroleum exporter, Russia is also in constant communication with Middle East petrostates and shares strategic interests with them. These connections make it slightly less peculiar that Orthodox Russia has embarked this year on a two-year experiment with Islamic banking in four Muslim-majority regions: Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Daghestan and Tatarstan. The experiment is being managed by the Russian Central Bank.
Russia has multiple reasons to position itself as friendly to Islam. Russia’s hinterland from the Caucasus to Mongolia is majority-Muslim and its post-Soviet economy has depended on Muslim migrant labor to compensate for domestic demographic decline. In the Middle East, the Kremlin seeks to establish itself as a significant player in the Arab-Muslim world amid the Washington-Beijing confrontation and the Persian Gulf countries’ pursuit of an augmented role on the international stage. In this context, Russia’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its support for Palestinian refugees, many of whom resettled in the North Caucasus under a humanitarian program instituted by Russian authorities, contribute to bolstering Moscow’s image in the Middle East.
Putin frames the ongoing Palestine conflict as a manifestation of US diplomatic failure and proffers Russia as a potential mediator, leveraging its amicable relationships with both Israel and the Palestinians. Putin’s official visits to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia last week aimed to weaken the Western narrative of Russian isolation over Ukraine. The Islamic-banking initiative is similarly seen as in part a response to Ukraine-related financial sanctions. The visits themselves had ultimately to do with money as much as politics: the UAE and Saudi Arabia can withstand a drop in oil prices, but Putin faces a pressing need for revenue, given the costs of the Ukraine war and their impact on his domestic support.
Since the inception of the Ukraine conflict, the Kremlin has increased its efforts to strengthen relations with the Arab-Muslim world, orchestrating various events within the territorial confines of the Russian Federation, particularly in regions with significant Muslim populations. The Kazan Forum 2023 was a prominent event featuring Moscow’s ties to Arab-Muslim countries, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council members. The focus was on accentuating Russia's role in ensuring a harmonious, multi-confessional, and multicultural society. Moscow is likely to intensify its relations and collaborative initiatives with the Gulf Cooperation Council members in energy, defense and logistics.
The lesson for investors is that 21st century religious revivalism is both powerful and not simple. For many centuries, Russian Orthodoxy was animated by the dream of retaking Istanbul (Constantinople) from the infidel Muslim usurpers Much of the tsar’s 19th century imperial gains were at the cost of Central Asian Muslim rulers, and after the Bolshevik revolution Islamic culture was often suppressed. Yet now the Orthodox paragon Putin is strengthening Russia’s Muslim ties on multiple fronts, domestic as well as international, and at least some Muslim states are responding in kind.