By Dee Smith
Several of the most important “pillars” supporting U.S. influence and power are now in danger of falling apart.
As noted earlier in this series, the U.S. was effectively the guarantor of global stability from the end of World War II until around 2010-2015. And a key reason it could do this was that the U.S. had unquestioned military superiority.
Not long ago, I was speaking to a senior military officer in an important (friendly) developing nation. He recounted how, 15 or 20 years ago, it was widely discussed among his peers in various countries that “you just don’t want to tangle with the U.S.—you will come off on the bad end of it.” This is why the U.S. could essentially send an aircraft carrier off the shore of a country and change its internal situation without firing a single shot.
But the U.S. is losing its military edge, hence more and more countries are less afraid of such a tangle. Why?
One straightforward reason is that the nature of conflict continues to change, as do its tools: drones, anti-drone systems, robots, autonomous weapons, lasers, cheaper missiles, fast missiles like “hypersonics,” and so forth are transforming war at an escalating pace. Generally, these technologies mean it is becoming easier for smaller forces to engage successfully with larger ones. But it is more than that. In the classic logic of an arms race, each new advance in weaponry is met by a countering system, which means the improvement may have limited effect. There is a “flavor of the month” quality to these advances—today’s favorite may not work that well tomorrow.
Even more important are the changes in battlefield dynamics. As Mara Karlin writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs:
What theorists call “the continuum of conflict” has changed. In an earlier era, one might have seen the terrorism and insurgency of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as inhabiting the low end of the spectrum, the armies waging conventional warfare in Ukraine as residing in the middle, and the nuclear threats shaping Russia’s war and China’s growing arsenal as sitting at the high end. Today, however, there is no sense of mutual exclusivity; the continuum has returned but also collapsed. In Ukraine, “robot dogs” patrol the ground and autonomous drones launch missiles from the sky amid trench warfare that looks like World War I—all under the specter of nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, combatants have combined sophisticated air and missile defense systems with individual shooting attacks by armed men riding motorcycles. In the Indo-Pacific, Chinese and Philippine forces face off over a sole dilapidated ship while the skies and seas surrounding Taiwan get squeezed by threatening maneuvers from China’s air force and navy.
There are reasons to believe, as Karlin proposes, that we are entering a new era of comprehensive conflict, for which she invokes the old term “total war.” She defines this as a situation in which “combatants draw on vast resources, mobilize their societies, prioritize warfare over all other state activities, attack a broad variety of targets, and reshape their economies and those of other countries.”
There are many elements to this evolution, but the return of maritime warfare is notable among them. In the post-9/11 “war on terror” period, most attacks, even by naval ships, were towards targets on the ground. But the naval military environment has quickly reemerged as a key area of conflict: in the Ukraine war, in the Houthi attacks against shipping in the Red Sea, in Chinese squabbles with its neighbors over territorial rights, and so forth. (Inter alia, the Houthi attacks are an excellent example of the rise of effective non-state—although often state-supported—actors in conflicts.)
Put simply, the U.S. has not invested enough in its navy, which by some measures is now smaller than China’s (although not in tonnage), to continue to deter other major powers at sea globally.
The pace of change and the scope of the demands that all this places on the U.S. military continue to escalate. The U.S. is responding to this need with upgrades, more rapid deployment of materiel (including to allies), and new or revived alliances, such as AUKUS and the Quad.
But all of this requires a great deal of money, and the U.S. military remains underfunded. Consider the Arctic, which is warming fast and may be partially ice-free year-round as early as 2030. It has enormous deposits of oil and gas, many already claimed—outside international territorial norms—by Russia. The thawing Arctic is also going to become a major global shipping route, offering enormous savings of time and money over traditional routes between the Pacific and Europe. In other words, the Arctic is already on its way to becoming an area of serious geopolitical conflict.
To address this important region, the U.S. has 5 operational icebreakers, but only 2 are heavy icebreakers (and none are nuclear-powered). Three more are planned.
Russia has 46 icebreakers—5 nuclear-powered—plus 14 on the way, 11 of which are under construction.
The U.S. spent so much treasure on ill-conceived wars in the Middle East that it not only diverted funding from much-needed military improvements and upgrades for many years, but it also provoked a reaction within the country.
As observed earlier, it would be hard to over-emphasize how tired the bulk of the U.S. population is of foreign wars, foreign commitments, foreign entanglements, foreign aid—they don’t believe any of it works to help them. The days of the American electorate accepting that they benefit when the U.S. defends other nations are gone. Instead, many Americans believe it just enriches the ruling elites of such countries, who, they think, play the U.S. like fools. Americans are done paying for this type of foreign policy.
And the question of money leads to consideration of another crumbling pillar of global American (and Western) influence: the post-Cold War primacy of the U.S. financial and governance model.