What could destabilize the emerging geoeconomic framework based on tech networks and alliances? An earlier post (“The Networks Trap,” 6 March 2024) examined how, as one result of the U.S.-China contest, the international system is dividing into two separate and distinct spheres for tech innovation, telecommunications, and military technology. In both the Chinese and American spheres these three sectors are being protected so that American technology will not be in Chinese networks and vice versa. Security alliances in particular, but also political alliances, are increasingly shaped by an emerging type of technological exclusivity. Most of the world would rather not have to choose between one tech ecosystem and another, but the viability of tech non-alignment seems to be weakening. “The Networks Trap” considered this in terms of Southeast and South Asia, where there are flourishing economies, strong domestic tech ecosystems, long-standing wariness of Chinese and American power, and a tradition of non-alignment. The post concluded that tech non-alignment will not be easy to maintain in the region and that the U.S.-led tech ecosystem was likely to prevail in competition with China’s own, even in China’s backyard.
What could disrupt this solidifying geoeconomic pattern?
One potential disruptor is India, which has pursued a technology-development path that avoids dependence on China or the U.S. India learned many lessons from China’s experience building an indigenous tech sector, including that if you welcome foreign venture capital it will come, but once foreign money and expertise have helped you build domestic capacity it might be best to unwelcome foreign capital except under conditions determined by the domestic private sector and the state. (It is perhaps an irony that much of the capital India welcomed and then unwelcomed was from China itself.) India learned from Europe that simply burdening foreign (American) technology with regulations gave no guarantee that domestic entrepreneurs would seize their opportunities. Like most countries, India has neither China’s technocratic relentlessness nor Europe’s high-end purchasing power. After decades of poor results, non-alignment is finally paying off for India. In principle, it could serve as a third-way model to others, such as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Brazil, and this could undermine the U.S.-China-driven tech-telecoms-security alignment currently under way.
However, India’s security worry is not the United States. It is China and its ally Pakistan. India’s security relationship with the U.S. keeps getting tighter, despite very considerable wariness on both sides. What India covets, as the U.S. well knows, is defense technology sharing and joint R&D — as distinct from arms sales. This gives the U.S. leverage to bring India into its networks and even its tech-innovation ecosystem. China’s comparative ability to do this is very weak. India will continue to seek non-alignment but the trend will nonetheless be toward stronger ties to the U.S.
A second potential disruptor of U.S.-China tech bipolarity is South Korean and Japanese dependence on tech exports. South Korea, Japan, and the United States are growing closer in terms of the tech innovation, telecommunications, and security triad. (The Center for a New American Security will release a report on this next week.) The difficulty is that South Korea and Japan, as aging and immigration-resistant societies with thin resource bases, rely on technology exports for growth at just the time when the U.S. is attempting to locate or relocate as much high-tech production to home as it can. This dynamic occurs with European tech powers and Taiwan as well. One partial solution is for these tech economies to relocate production into the U.S., satisfying the U.S. security requirement for production within American sovereign territory while retaining the earnings — in effect, an internationalization of U.S. production that also makes it possible for Japan, South Korea, and the rest to sell into the U.S. market without difficulty. But U.S. preference will still go to U.S. companies, as the extraordinary subsidization of Intel ($8.5 billion in grants and potentially even more in loans) shows. Powers like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Germany cannot hope to be non-aligned in the way India aspires to be, but all these relationships will need to be sensitively managed on all sides, especially the American side. The economic fruits of a U.S.-led tech alliance cannot go disproportionately to the U.S. or its companies.
There are other potential disruptors. China and Chinese tech companies could extend their established practice of selling into markets too unremunerative (much of Africa and Latin America and parts of Asia) or ethically too dodgy (MENA) or both (Central Asia) to appeal to American, Korean, and Japanese tech companies. That would give China a significant advantage. Another possibility is that cybersecurity will become too difficult to maintain across a large number of semi-allied American partners, resulting in resentment of the core — say, the Five Eyes plus Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and some Europeans — by the periphery and political weakness throughout the network.
But the greatest threat is probably an American inability to share either power or wealth. The U.S. is currently engaged in developing defense-production partnerships around the world. The immediate spur has been the Ukraine war: even the Europeans and the Americans together have struggled to keep production at the necessary levels to meet official commitments to Ukraine. Their defense industrial capacity has barely been up to it. The reason is not a lack of military manufacturing capacity per se. Rather it has to do with the downsides involved in the allocation of that capacity to military purposes, which economists generally understand as among the least productive of economic activities: If you manufacture an automobile, it will be used by its purchaser for a variety of purposes that will themselves be economically significant; if you make a tank, its one purpose will be to destroy value, if it is ever used at all. Defense contractors are therefore peculiar animals, protected by states, and enjoying preferential relationships and long-term contracts, in exchange for the preservation and refinement of industrial capacity to provide the arms a state might need to ensure its survival. But in most cases they are a drag on overall productivity, which is why states are often quite happy to buy arms rather than divert resources to producing them.
So for economic as well as political reasons the U.S. does not want to be sole supplier to Ukraine or others. Instead, the U.S. hopes to broaden defense supply chains, seizing what Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Jessica Lewis called “a once-in-a-generation opportunity to transition countries off Russian-origin equipment, improve NATO interoperability, promote transparency and accountability in security sectors, and strengthen our defense industrial capacity.” (Lewis’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs handles approval of foreign weapons sales.) By “our” Lewis meant European allies, although she went on, in this December 2023 speech, to identify a similar dynamic in Asia. But is it politically or economically possible to internationalize U.S.-allied defense production? Can such an expansion be secure, in cyber and other terms? Will U.S. defense companies be willing to share the risks and profits of production with overseas partners? Will Congress, which determines the contours of defense spending, be willing to let them?
As the international system divides into two separate and distinct spheres for tech innovation, telecommunications, and military technology, one dominated by the U.S. and the other by China, the process has many potential disruptors. The greatest is that the U.S. will be unable to manage this new and untried variety of internationalism.