The recent focus in Europe has understandably been on security. The European Union committed to massive support ($54 billion) for Ukraine, Donald Trump again put America’s commitment to European security in question with his remarks on NATO, and Alexei Navalny died at 47 in a Siberian penal colony. These were the leading topics at last weekend’s Munich Security Conference. But poor economic performance is the deeper problem in Europe and will remain so after memories of the conference fade. There are solutions available. Whether Europeans will choose to pursue them is the question.
The single market has been the great success of European integration. However, the EU’s 27 member states retain considerable authority over defense, telecommunications, finance, and energy. The economic integration of the continent seems to be reaching its limit under the current governance structure. This harms competitiveness, because national entrepreneurial energies are directed to national companies that serve national markets, some of which are very small. While the overall EU market is enormous (448 million people), the great majority of European companies, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), develop and market their products for national markets.
One clear solution would be to reduce the inherent barriers that keep European competitiveness trapped in 27 individual boxes. This is likely to be the main focus of two reports for the European Commission, one on the internal market and another on EU competitiveness. The first will probably arrive in April and the second in July.
But will dramatic steps toward greater integration be taken? The chances don’t seem good. The EU’s recent embrace of industrial policy has hugely privileged the largest economies, Germany in particular. Faced with Covid and then the Russian invasion of Ukraine — followed by an American turn to industrial policy under Joe Biden, notably for green industries and products — the EU, under Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, turned on the aid spigots. The funding went to deal with Covid, reboot European weapons production, stimulate the greening of the European economy, and triangulate economic aid in relation to US priorities as revealed in the Inflation Reduction Act, among other goals. The biggest beneficiaries of this sudden largesse were the economies with the greatest capacity to answer policy needs. Not surprisingly, these were also the largest economies. About half the aid between March 2022 and August 2023 went to Germany — half, that is, of €733 billion.
In such a situation, the willingness of smaller European countries to give up what control they retain over defense, telecommunications, finance, and energy is going to be limited. The brain drain from smaller to larger economies has further fueled resentment of the major European powers and left large parts of the region populated mainly by the elderly or by younger people who are either determined to stay in place or feel that they have little choice. Given these dynamics, the growth of nationalism in smaller or medium-sized electorates, and in the less developed parts of larger ones, seems inevitable. It would directly militate against the political viability of further economic integration. So would the ongoing flow of European capital to the US in that it acts to reduce investment in Europe.
Still, the European model of governance innovation has always been a kind of crisis response and Europe is now rich in crises. Russia’s actions in Ukraine inspired a surge in European defense spending, reviving a sector that had been in decline. The first Trump administration delivered a severe shock to Europe; a second would do the same. Some European reformers joke that a Trump presidency might be just what it takes to reinvigorate the European project. Kamala Harris, at the Munich Security Conference, carried a message of reassurance about American commitments to Europe, but she might not be in any position to fulfill that promise.
Investing in Europe necessitates close attention to these dynamics. Large-scale EU industrial policy is likely to continue for some time. The EU is participating in an “onshoring” cycle that is just as vigorous in China, the US, and India. Each of these reacts to the others, deepening the replication of production in the world’s largest economies. Selling further integration to European electorates will probably require more emphasis on industrial policy rather than less, along with a serious commitment to making Europe more competitive and less dependent upon the US and China. This seems certain to create new trans-Atlantic tensions as the US reacts to European “protectionism.” In many ways, an integrated trans-Atlantic market seems to be the only long-term solution for a Europe in demographic decline, but the chances of it are getting lower.