In September 2019, more than 50,000 Indian Americans traveled to NRG Stadium in Houston to attend a rally in support of two of the world’s most prominent nationalist politicians: Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then-President Donald Trump. Modi modified his own 2014 campaign slogan for the occasion, proclaiming “Abki baar, Trump sarkar!” In other words, “This time, a Trump government!”
It seemed a natural political marriage between two bombastic campaigners who had overturned the political establishments of their respective countries largely through an innovative combination of aggressive social media campaigns, ethno-nationalist rhetoric, and thinly veiled antipathy to Islam. The event’s potential to benefit Trump’s cause was clear: in the offing was a possible infusion of support for his candidacy among a growing population of Indian Americans. Modi’s interest in joining the controversial and capricious Trump onstage was less obvious. He chose to associate himself very publicly with an American president whose popularity has never overwhelmed the Indian electorate, whose policies never favored India, and whose victory in the 2020 elections was by no means assured. It was far out of character for an Indian PM not only to take a public position on the domestic politics of another country, but to insert himself into a foreign election in support of a particular candidate. The move earned him tepid praise from Indian political commentators and, although one hears little else than acclaim for Modi’s India from Washington today, could not possibly have earned him any favor with the Biden administration.
Biden and Modi are aware that the geopolitical and macroeconomic logic pulling India and the US into a strategic embrace is inexorable. The embrace has thus far manifested in several cooperative initiatives between the two states since Biden took office in January 2021. The most notable has been the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which aims to promote bilateral cooperation in areas from defense technology innovation to semiconductor supply and higher education. As Americans prepare to vote in another presidential election in November, investors in Indian industry would do well to consider what might become of the burgeoning partnership between the two countries if Trump were reelected.
The price of Modi’s endorsement appears to have been Trump’s tacit approval for the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, which made eligible for Indian citizenship all Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians who fled to India from persecution in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan before December 2014, with the notable exception of Muslims. The Act was part of a series of legislative measuresdesigned to threaten the citizenship of Muslims in India who, like much of the native-born population of India, have little or no legal documentation of their citizenship. In keeping with Trump’s transactional style of diplomacy, the quid pro quo between the two leaders does not seem to have extended any further than this simple exchange. Both men are committed to protectionist trade policies that discourage foreign competition in many sectors of their respective economies. Under Trump, a skilled-worker visa program that had long allowed foreign workers (roughly 75% of whom were Indian) to live and work in “specialty occupations” in the US was suspended in April 2020 by presidential decree. The suspension was allowed by President Biden to expire in April 2021. The Republican-sponsored CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) began in mid-2019 to impose heavy sanctions on companies and countries that continued to import oil from Iran. India, as Iran’s then-second largest buyer of oil, was no exception, despite Modi’s personal and ideological alignment with Trump. Political amity was similarly insufficient to allow their administrations to agree the terms of a promised US-India trade deal, or even the “mini-deal” that was promoted in its place when it became clear that a comprehensive deal could not be hammered out. Despite Modi’s talk of taking the US-India relationship “to new heights” with Trump, evidence suggests that Trump’s two immediate predecessors did far more to advance that relationship, and that his successor has gone to still greater lengths to embrace India. A shared contempt for Islam and liberal hegemony is not, it would seem, an adequate substitute for sustained diplomatic efforts made in earnest pursuit of mutually beneficial cooperation.
Trump has been uncharacteristically consistent in his willingness to treat US commitments abroad as political hostages, holding aid, security commitments, climate agreements, and arms control treaties over the heads of US allies and adversaries alike in an effort to appeal to his isolationist base. If reelected, he might well hold hostage the fruits of Biden’s efforts to build a lasting structure for American cooperation with India. He might decide to treat India’s increasing access to American capital, technology, and manufacturing contracts under Biden as a privilege to be revoked at his pleasure, with few domestic consequences for his administration and many for Modi’s. The iCET is not part of Trump’s personal legacy and might well be considered disposable. India’s position as a regional counterweight to China makes it indispensable to American strategy in the Indo-Pacific, but even as President, Trump never confined his role to the pursuit of US interests abroad. Indeed, he often acted against them. In the announcement of his plan to impose a universal 10% tariff on all imports to the US, and in Modi’s ever-louder emphasis on Indian self-reliance, we can see that the indiscriminate protectionism that left a US-India trade deal dead in the water is alive and well.
Click to subscribe to SIGnal and receive notifications when new posts are available.