You Choose, You Lose? (I&W)

You Choose, You Lose?

The idea that the world’s states need to choose between the U.S. and China has been an article of faith in the U.S. intelligence community for some time. It broke the surface this week in a Foreign Affairs piece by Richard Fontaine, CEO of the influential think tank the Center for New American Security (CNAS), entitled “The Myth of Neutrality: Countries Will Have to Choose between America and China.” While Fontaine’s article is, as is usually the case, more modulated than the headline, he nonetheless concludes that the “time for choosing has arrived,” focusing in particular on “the effort to separate and safeguard technological supply chains.” SIG questions whether this is really the case.

The first problem with this argument is that technological supply chains are in private hands. The ability of any state, even China, to control its private-sector tech supply chains is uneven at best. This is true not just in present terms — the extent and nature of supply chains are not easy to measure, and measurement and enforcement can use government resources that might be better applied elsewhere — but also in prospective terms: supply-chain inputs and their providers change constantly. Moreover, Chinese and U.S. tech companies alike have multiple subsidiaries, JVs, equity investments, strategic partnerships, and so on outside their home markets, and those entities in turn have their own relationships. SIG’s experience in investigating Chinese and U.S. corporate ownership and part-ownership structures like these across the globe strongly suggests that arranging tech supply chains to conform with the political map will be difficult indeed.

The second problem with the choice argument is that it misses the non-equivalency of the U.S. and China in terms of tech sectors. At least since the expulsion of Google more than a decade ago, China has built its tech sector on the basis of a protected domestic market. As companies like Huawei, Alibaba, Didi Chuxing, and Tencent established themselves and grew, they enjoyed many advantages in having a gigantic captive market. However, that growth model had a dependency built into it, and when the Communist Party decided that Chinese tech companies were gaining too much social power it was easily able to clip their wings. The Party did not blink at liquidating tens of billions in equity value. Chinese tech companies are being obliged to subordinate themselves to state policy priorities, a process that shows no signs of easing. While the Party also works hard to build Chinese self-reliance in terms of supply chains and much else, supply-chain inputs really are the least of it, because the state has so much leverage in the C-suite already. The problem of Chinese tech companies is not guarding the home country’s supply chains but getting into other countries’ supply chains — and China’s autarkic policies, because they amount to a kind of nationalization, only make that problem worse.

The situation in the U.S. is nearly the opposite. The U.S. is an open market. It sources supply-chain inputs, capital, and talent from all over the planet. The most onerous government tech regulations prevent some (not many) U.S. companies from selling into the China market, but in this the U.S. has a willing assistant in Chinese state policy. Corporate espionage and IP theft aside, the Chinese state does not want U.S. companies supplying Chinese markets, except in those instances where Chinese companies still can’t match non-Chinese producers.

There really isn’t much of a choice to be made. China is a non-market economy with a security obsession and it sources supply-chain inputs for those things it can’t locate domestically. The U.S. is a market economy that sources supply-chain inputs from wherever they currently are cheapest. Yes, there are constraints for U.S. companies on sourcing from China, but that leaves all of the rest of the world for U.S. companies to work with.

That points to a third major problem with the choice argument as regards tech supply chains. Companies in the rest of the world can also make things and sell them into their domestic markets and into the 193 national markets that are not the U.S. or China. To the degree that the U.S. or China try to force a choice, the most attractive choice will usually be “both” while reserving the option of “neither.” If these choices are rendered impossible, most countries will choose the U.S., not because of its values but because its open economy has greater possibilities for them. From the supply point of view, as Fontaine notes, China competes well on price — ZTE will build a 5G network for less than Nokia would charge — but as non-Chinese, non-U.S. suppliers increasingly come online, how long can a country with rising wages and government debt, a shrinking workforce, and a non-convertible currency compete on price?

The security question is a separate one: It will not be (and never has been) easy to be an ally of both the U.S. and China, or to be neutral. But in terms of tech supply chains, the choice between the U.S. and China, in most sectors and for most countries, is a false one.

How Putin Goes (I&W)

How Putin Goes

The speed with which, in handling Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group insurrection, Vladimir Putin went from bluster to bargaining led many analysts to declare that his weakness had been exposed and his demise would arrive soon. But Putin's departure from power is not forthcoming in the near future. The convergence of the interests that fortify Putin's existing system is robust and compelling. Putin is currently consolidating his position in preparation for elections in 2024.

In March, a year after his invasion of Ukraine, Putin's popularity remained very high, with an approval rating surpassing 80%, as indicated by a survey conducted by Levada, an independent Russian research organization. In some ways, recent developments fortified Putin's position: disloyal individuals have been exposed and purged. Sources closely associated with the general staff and the security services confirmed that General Sergey Surovikin was interrogated, while three undisclosed U.S. officials reported that Surovikin possessed prior knowledge of Prigozhin's plot to incite rebellion against Russia's military leadership.

Undeniably, Russia’s internal security crisis has eroded Putin’s stature on the global stage. But this erosion is more likely to push him to further provocative actions than to lead him to withdraw from the scene. The confluence of this crisis with the annual NATO summit (11 July) in Vilnius raises the prospect of potential assertive responses from Putin.

At home, Putin is very practiced at adjusting his authoritarianism to circumstances. He has learned from observing his Syrian ally, Bashar Al Assad, and the way in which his neighbor Recep Tayyip Erdogan defended his power in 2016. Rather than destabilizing the prevailing authoritarian regime, the Wagner coup is poised to reinforce and perpetuate authoritarianism through the adoption of novel strategies and practices.

Prigozhin, however, is not going to go away quietly. His security-oriented mindset is firmly grounded in profit-seeking. It is inconceivable that someone of Prigozhin's disposition could accept that the Russian Ministry of Defense would assimilate his Wagner troops by formalizing their involvement through contractual agreements, transforming them into an official component of the Russian military. His army is his business, one he is most likely to keep vital in Africa. Enterprises such as Lobaye Invest in the Central African Republic and M-Invest, along with its subsidiary Meroe Gold in Sudan, have emerged as key players involved in resource exploitation, controlling significant mining concessions. Several have recently been granted long-term extensions, further solidifying their hold on valuable resources. Wagner has rights to the Ndassima mine in the Central African Republic through a comprehensive 25-year contract with potential for extension. Prigozhin is resolute in his reluctance to relinquish any aspect of this expansive enterprise.

Of course, Putin and Prigozhin are both mortal as well as rich in enemies. But violent deaths aside, they will find ways to survive in the brutal world they know so well.

The A.I. Scare (I&W)

The A.I. Scare

With the release of ChatGPT in November 2022, the regulation of artificial intelligence suddenly entered the realm of popular politics and media commentary. By May 2023, AI experts were circulating a letter that referred to “mitigating the risk of extinction from AI.” In the same month, the EU Parliament was refining what it called “the first ever rules for Artificial Intelligence.” This wasn’t really true—China got there first—but it did reflect the high level of political energy surrounding the topic. By late June, US President Biden was in San Francisco warning tech leaders about AI’s dangers. The American Enterprise Institute, in line with news-cycle tradition, raised the alarm about excessive regulation.

SIG’s view is that there is both more and less here than meets the eye: “more” in the sense that state regulation of AI is indeed coming on fast; “less” because its effects are not likely to be very dramatic, at least not in the United States.

The Regulatory Wave

China, which early on saw AI as both a strategic technology and a threat to state control of speech and opinion, led the way on AI regulation in 2017 (the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan”) and hoped that its standards would gain international adoption. The powerful Standardization Administration of China (SAC) issued 53 “Guidelines for the Construction of the National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Standard System” in 2020, meeting the deadline set by the 2017 AI Plan. As typically happens in China in moments of political enthusiasm, different bureaucracies began to compete for the new turf and the Communist Party needed to pick some winners and assert its authority. In March 2023, at the Two Congresses, the Party reshuffled bureaucratic authorities and centralized the domestic assertion of AI power, very much in step with the “rectification” of Chinese big-tech power that began in 2021. The extent of Party concern about AI regulation can be measured by the fact that China actually agreed with the United States on some non-binding standards for military AI use in February 2023.

The US, also typically, has been much slower in developing regulations, although it was quick to develop desiderata that don’t seem to have had much real force: Donald Trump’s 2019 Executive Order and a November 2020 Memorandum, followed by Biden’s Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights in October 2022. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) took 2 years to consult stakeholders before issuing the “AI Risk Management Framework” in January 2023. The EU was on a similar schedule.

In general, China’s regulatory framework seeks to control information and remind Chinese tech companies that they operate at the pleasure of the Party. The EU aims at identifying and eliminating potential AI harms without constraining innovation. China and the EU both shape much of their efforts with the goal of minimizing dependency on US companies. The US aims at maximizing American innovation and minimizing harms to individual rights.

The 3 efforts reflect very different political cultures, suggesting that they will not be synthesized into broader international standards. In all 3 cases, a principal motivation has been to develop standards that will help each player improve its competitive position against one or both of the other players. It’s hard to see how competition will turn into cooperation any time soon.

So tech regulation is coming, more and more. Unlike at earlier moments of tech revolution, however, there is no free infrastructural (the open Internet) or commercial (unrestrained use of apps) or political (no data sovereignty, no privacy) global platform that AI can build on before it is regulated away. The AI platform is being pre-regulated.

Meanwhile, Back at the Startup

Actual tech regulation, as distinct from the setting out of ideas about things that tech should and shouldn’t do, has traditionally been led by industry. AI will not be much different.

So far, AI innovation has tended to come from smaller companies connected to the open-source community. Broadly, this has been the pattern for tech innovation for decades. It’s possible that AI innovation, too, will follow the pattern that led much of humanity to use the same search engine and a handful of social-media apps: a small company gains a technical advantage, is well run, has the capital to scale its platform without having to generate profits, eats its competitors, and wins big. But the conversation among AI industry leaders today is about whether or not AI innovation will grow based on these same “network effects” rooted in tech, capital, scale, and quantity of data.

The answer might very well be “no.” 

Why? Mainly because AI development teams increasingly turn toward “synthetic data,” that is, curated data sets that are edited to increase the chances of the AI system itself arriving at a desired result—not a specific result, of course, but a result within set parameters, a usable result. This means that the advantage of having huge controllable datasets—which was thought to give China and US big tech significant advantages just a few years ago—is not necessarily that important. It also means that AI development is not a prisoner to the need for scale that so shaped the development of search and social media.

Under these circumstances, AI regulation will be harder to do in any detail because innovators will be small and quick and the use cases for their products hard to predict.

The exception to this small-size advantage is computing power, known in the jargon as “compute”. Large companies with deep pockets have the advantage in compute. That said, compute is itself a product, as Amazon Web Services discovered and proved. And size can be a burden: the biggest companies tend to innovate in ways that take advantage of their size (e.g. lots of compute power) but can also lead them to innovate in ways that don’t matter to the actual market. The history of big-tech failures—Google Wave, Facebook Beacon—is suggestive.

What is Intelligence - Part #1: Looking for Trouble (@SIG)

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Part 1: Looking for Trouble

By Dee Smith
Chief Executive Officer and Founder

As head of a private intelligence agency—Strategic Insight Group (or SIG)—I am often asked what intelligence is and how it works. How is it different from other kinds of research? So here is a description that I hope will be helpful.

First of all, intelligence is very different from espionage. Traditionally, espionage is the practice of using spies to procure information. A modern variant is of course “cyber espionage”: a kind of cyberattack where the goal is to enter a computer system in an unauthorized and undetected way to access valuable intellectual property (IP) or sensitive or secret information. Espionage is often conducted by governments against other governments, as well as against opposing parties within their own countries. All governments conduct some form of it. It is also used in commercial settings—often called “industrial espionage”—but this is considered unethical and is illegal in most jurisdictions. Government intelligence against other governments is usually not considered illegal in the country in which it originates, or its legality is disregarded. This is because different rules—or a lack of rules—apply to sovereign states. There is a level of anarchy in inter-state relations, as there is no real overarching global legal authority, and what international law there is is weak and is often disregarded and unenforced.

Intelligence is not espionage, but it is also not the same as the general kind of research as undertaken by many people. Often, research on a topic gathers relatively easily obtained information and categorizes, synthesizes, and draws conclusions from it.

In contrast, intelligence is a very specific kind of research with a focus on revealing hidden information—to find things that others do not expect you to know or do not want you to know. The goal is to enable you to more completely understand the nature of a situation and to characterize the forces influencing it. Furthermore, intelligence often strives to provide continuing awareness of how something is developing, and early warning of emerging threats and opportunities.

The goal of any good intelligence operation is to produce “actionable” intelligence: something that a client who uses the intelligence) can act on. Intelligence works best when the question being asked by the client is very specific: “Are there negative indicators that should warn me against investing with this group?” or “Will an opponent in a lawsuit fight to the end or settle?”

Finding things that others do not want you to know might seem ethically questionable, but consider, for example, that many of our clients at SIG are large investors who manage money for ordinary people who have entrusted their retirement savings to pension plans or other investment funds. Imagine the following situation: a fund manager is proposing to make an investment in an entity, but that entity is itself acting unethically by hiding or misrepresenting issues. A good intelligence process could detect this, allowing the fund manager to make a better decision.  

When certain rules and procedures are followed, private intelligence can be conducted entirely legally, as SIG does on a daily basis.
 The intelligence that SIG conducts is essentially threat identification, risk mitigation, and fraud detection: we are “looking for trouble” . . . so we can keep clients—and the people whose money is entrusted to them—out of it.

How does intelligence work? It works by collecting a large array of data—many small pieces, from many different sources, not all of which are decisive or even terribly important. But when you collect the right pieces, and put them together using appropriate tools and techniques, the process can reveal hidden information about actors and their intentions—good or bad—and about their weaknesses and strengths. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The Importance of Patterns

Sometimes a single piece of information can make all the difference. Far more often, however, it is the pattern of evidence that reveals the “lay of the land,” so to speak. You never know, until you begin collecting and analyzing it, what piece of data, from what source, will tell the tale . . .

Consider a subject who suddenly begins to receive speeding tickets or to borrow increasing sums of money. This may be a window into their personal life. Has something changed? If they head an investment fund, is it something so distracting that it might take their eyes off the proverbial ball? Or consider an individual who is found to have 3 bankruptcies, is a defendant in multiple lawsuits, and has tax liens every year for multiple years. What does this pattern across indicators tell you about their operating style?

There are two key elements: 1) multiple sources, because NO one source is dependable, no matter how legitimate it seems and 2) zero-based analysis, in which assumptions that everyone “knows” to be true (even if they are not) are discarded in favor of collecting data, analyzing it, and looking for patterns and anomalies that can reveal the nature of individuals, companies, and events. Then, the intelligence process creates hypotheses that might explain what has been observed, testing them to confirm or contradict them.
Intelligence that produces insight is iterative by nature. A conceptual device known as the “Intelligence Cycle” illustrates the process in a general way. It may circle around several times within a project, as new information is found and analyzed or tested.

Results of the Intelligence Process

Intelligence does not seek to predict the future, but to provide a better understanding of the present. From that, it can allow a user to take action on the basis of early indicators—before irreparable damage has occurred. It can also provide a basis for projecting forward more likely or less likely scenarios. By pinpointing key elements, it can also allow focused systems of monitoring (known as “Indications and Warnings” or I&W in intelligence jargon) to be established as a way of providing continuous “situational awareness.”

In the end, intelligence is only as good as the processes and protocols used in its collection and preparation. But properly conducted, it can produce astonishingly accurate insights to detect problems at an early stage and then to avoid or mitigate them.

Next in the series: The Difference Between Open Source Intelligence and Human Intelligence, and their Uses

Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement (I&W)

Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement

The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, engineered by China in March, received a mostly favorable reception, with analysts suggesting that the process of normalization could alleviate regional tensions and pave the way for a tangible reduction of hostilities between Riyadh and Teheran. Some possibilities that have been aired include a cessation of Iran's interventions in Bahrain, Saudi capital infusions into Iran, and the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation.

But Saudi-Iranian relations are governed solely by self-interest and driven by the intricacies of geopolitics in the region and the emergence of a multipolar global paradigm. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran still aspire to be regional powerhouses and principal actors in this evolving multipolar order. China’s role in bringing them together is itself principally geopolitical. It is intended to improve China’s position in its long struggle with the United States. Whatever peace effects it might have are all to the good, but they were not the point. Neither Iran nor Saudi is especially weary of conflict. The rapprochement is part of a complex power struggle, not an embrace of peace.

It is up to Saudi and Iran to demonstrate that there is any substance to the agreement.  A crucial aspect that has yet to be adequately addressed is the establishment of some foundation of trust between the two nations. Considering their enduring rivalry and a historical backdrop riddled with mutual mistrust, Saudi Arabia and Iran both need to demonstrate some dedication to resolving their differences and participating in productive discourse together. Such efforts have not yet materialized, and until they do, the prevailing geopolitical landscape in the Middle East will persist unchanged, despite the purported reconciliation.

While there may be a convergence of interests in defying the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iran have very different objectives in the region. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) harbors a grand vision of reshaping not only the face of Saudi Arabia within the Middle East but also its standing on the global stage. MBS's decrees are  unquestionable in the kingdom;  Saudi foreign policy is inextricable from his ambitions. MBS has shown no intention of relinquishing power or engaging in conflict de-escalation. Foremost on his agenda is elevating Saudi Arabia to the status of a preeminent power in the Middle East, employing any means necessary to achieve this objective.

The pursuit of hosting the World Cup in 2030 stands as a prominent testament to Saudi Arabia's endeavor to foster international engagement. This initiative, alongside notable undertakings such as the Neom project and the establishment of a desert-based ski resort, exemplifies Saudi Arabia's transformative policy trajectory. But the global battles over Saudi Arabia’s alternative golf league show that much of the world is unwilling to do much more than humor Saudi episodes of over-spending.

Iran’s attachment to the deal is costless. Its gradual movement toward Russia and China is propelled by many factors but peace is not one of them. Iran has chosen this paper peace as a way to position itself better in its struggle with its enemies.

‘’The new era’’ hailed by diplomats of both states is as thin as a straw, for it is sustained by temporary interests and untested alliances in a changing geopolitical landscape that cannot be predicted by anyone, and certainly cannot be controlled by two relatively minor players.